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12.1  Introduction 
In recent years there has been a burst of scholarly interest in various 
aspects of monetary reform-not  the conduct of current monetary pol- 
icy, which has for decades been the object of active scholarly work, 
but the institutional structure of the monetary system. This interest has 
centered on three separate but related topics:  (1)  competition versus 
government monopoly  in the creation of or control over outside or 
high-powered money, (2) so-called free banking, and (3) the determi- 
nation of the unit of account and its relation to media of exchange. The 
topics are related because they all deal with what role, if any, govern- 
ment has in the monetary system. 
This burst of interest has been a response to mutually reinforcing 
developments,  some internal to the discipline of economics; others, 
external. 
The internal developments were threefold. One is the emergence of 
the theory of public choice, which has produced a large-scale shift from 
a public-interest to a private-interest interpretation of government ac- 
tivity. Instead of regarding civil servants and legislators as disinterest- 
edly pursuing the public interest, as they judged it-in  sharp contrast 
to the behavior we have attributed to participants in business enter- 
prises-economists have increasingly come to regard civil servants and 
legislators as pursuing their private interests, treated not as narrowly 
pecuniary or selfish but as encompassing whatever ends enter into their 
utility functions,  not excluding concern for the public interest. This 
public choice perspective is extremely attractive intellectually because 
it aligns our interpretations of government and private activity. It has 
inevitably  led to extensive research on the determinants of govern- 
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mental behavior as well as to renewed attention to the kinds of insti- 
tutions and policies, if any, that can make each participant in govern- 
ment as in a free market operate as if, in Adam Smith’s famous phrase, 
he were “led by an invisible hand to promote an end that was no part 
of his intention,”  namely, the interest of the public. Monetary policy 
and the monetary authorities  have been obvious candidates  for attention.  1 
A second internal development is the rational expectations approach, 
particularly its stress on the effect of  the institutional  structure and 
changes in the institutional structure on the expectations of the public. 
In one sense, this approach is not new. For example, the effect of the 
existence of  central banks on the behavior of commercial banks and 
the public had long been explicitly recognized in the monetary litera- 
ture. Yet, the coining of a new name, the application of the idea by 
Lucas to the validity of econometric forecasts, and the explicit mo- 
delling of the role of expectations have all had a major impact on the 
profession’s thinking and, incidentally, have promoted greater attention 
to institutional structures as compared with current policy formation. 
A third  internal development is the renewed  interest  in  so-called 
Austrian Economics, with its emphasis on invisible-hand interpreta- 
tions of the origin and development of economic institutions, and its 
interpretation of the business cycle as largely reflecting the effect of 
non-neutral money. The latter in turn produced a long “Austrian”  tra- 
dition of  support for “hard”  money and opposition to discretionary 
money management. Hayek’s proposal (1976, 1978) for denationalizing 
money was especially influential in reviving this tradition. 
The key external development-the  ultimate consequences of which 
are shrouded in uncertainty-was  the emergence of a world monetary 
system that, we believe, is unprecedented: a system in which essentially 
every currency in the world is, directly or indirectly, on a pure fiat 
standard--directly, if the exchange rate of the currency is flexible though 
possibly manipulated; indirectly, if the exchange rate is effectively fixed 
in  terms of  another fiat-based currency (e.g.,  since  1983, the Hong 
Kong dollar). This system emerged gradually after World War I. From 
then to 1971, much of  the world was effectively on a dollar standard, 
while the U.S., though ostensibly on a gold standard (except for a brief 
interval in 1933-34),  was actually on a fiat standard combined with a 
government program for pegging the price of gold. The Bretton Woods 
agreement in  the main  simply ratified that  situation, despite the lip 
service paid  to the role of  gold,  and the provisions  for changes in 
exchange rates. The end of Bretton Woods in 1971 removed both the 
formal links to the dollar and the pretense that the U.S. was on a gold 
standard. The stocks of gold listed on the books of the central books 
of the world are a relic of a bygone era, though a slim possibility remains 
that they will again become more than that at some future date. 291  Has Government Any Role in Money? 
The formal ending of Bretton Woods was precipitated by an infla- 
tionary surge in the U.S.  in the 1960s and in turn helped to produce a 
continuation and acceleration of that surge in the 1970s. The inflation 
and the subsequent economic instability were more directly responsible 
for the burst of interest in monetary reform than the momentous change 
in the world’s monetary system of which the inflation was both a cause 
and a manifestation.  It did so in several ways.  In the first place, it 
brought into sharp focus the poor performance  of  the monetary au- 
thorities-reinforcing  the conclusions about prior policy that various 
scholars had reached,  including ourselves in our Monetary History. 
Even granted the market failures that we and many other economists 
had attributed to a strictly laissez-faire policy in money and banking, 
the course of events encouraged the view that turning to government 
as an alternative was a cure that was worse than the disease, at least 
with existing government policies and institutions. Government failure 
might be worse than market failure. 
In the second place, the rise in nominal interest rates produced by 
the rise in inflation converted government control of interest rates in 
the U.S. via Regulation Q from a minor to a serious impediment to the 
effective clearing of  credit markets. One response was the invention 
of money market mutual funds as a way to avoid Regulation Q. The 
money market funds performed a valuable social function. Yet, from 
a broader perspective, their invention constituted social waste. If either 
the inflation had not occurred or banks had been free to respond to 
market forces, there would have been no demand for the services of 
money market funds, and the entrepreneurial talent and other resources 
absorbed by the money market mutuals could have been employed in 
socially more productive activities. The money market funds proved 
an entering wedge to financial innovations that forced a relaxation and 
near-abandonment  of  control over the interest rates that banks could 
pay, as well as over other regulations that restricted their activities. 
The deregulation of banking that has occurred came too late and has 
been too incomplete to prevent a sharp reduction in the role of banks, 
as traditionally defined, in the financial system as a whole. 
In Friedman’s Program for Monetary Stability, published a quarter 
of a century ago, he asked the question “whether monetary and banking 
arrangements could be left to the market, subject only to the general 
rules applying to all other economic activity.” 
“I am by no means certain,”  he wrote, “that the answer is indubita- 
bly in the negative. What is clear is that monetary arrangements have 
seldom been left entirely to the market, even in societies following a 
thoroughly  liberal policy in other respects, and that there are good 
reasons why this should have been the case” [Friedman (1959, p. 4)]. 
Those “good  reasons”  were:  ‘“13  the resource cost of a pure com- 292  Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz 
modity currency and hence its tendency to become partly fiduciary; 
[2] the peculiar difficulty of enforcing contracts involving promises to 
pay that serve as a medium of  exchange and of preventing  fraud in 
respect to  them; [3] the technical monopoly character of a pure fiduciary 
currency which makes essential the setting of some external limit on 
its amount; and finally, [4] the pervasive character of  money which 
means that the issuance of money has important effects of parties other 
than those directly involved and gives special importance to the pre- 
ceding features. Something like a moderately stable monetary frame- 
work  seems an essential prerequisite for the effective operation of a 
private market economy. It is dubious that the market can by itself 
provide such a framework. Hence, the function of providing one is an 
essential governmental function on a par with the provision of a stable 
legal framework”  [Friedman (1959, p. 8), numbers added]. 
Of course, recognition that there are “good reasons” for government 
to intervene and that, as a matter of historical fact, governments, and 
especially modem governments, almost invariably have done so, does 
not mean that the actual interventions have promoted the public wel- 
fare, or that the modes of intervention have been wisely chosen. A 
major aim of our Monetary History was precisely to investigate this 
question for the U.S. for the period after the Civil War. 
The evidence we assembled strongly suggests, indeed  we believe 
demonstrates, that government intervention was  at least as often a 
source of instability and inefficiency as the reverse, and that the major 
“reform”  during the period, the establishment of the Federal Reserve 
System, in practice did more harm than good. Our personal conclusion, 
reinforced by the evidence in that work though not stated therein, is 
that a rigid monetary rule is preferable to discretionary monetary man- 
agement by the Federal Reserve. 
The aim of this paper is to consider whether the new evidence and 
new arguments that have emerged in recent years justify a revision of 
the earlier summary of  “good  reasons”  why government has inter- 
vened, in particular of the conclusion that “the market itself cannot 
provide” a “stable monetary framework.”  In the most extreme form, 
does the evidence  justify an unqualified affirmative rather than negative 
answer to the question “whether monetary and banking arrangements 
cannot [i.e., should not] be left to the market”? 
This question in turn breaks down into three separate questions, the 
clear differentiation of which is one of the valuable contributions of 
recent writings: 
(1) Can and should the determination of a unit of account linked with 
a medium of exchange and the provision of outside money itself 
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good reasons justify  a government role in  defining the unit of 
account and providing an outside money? 
(2) Given a well-defined outside money involving a unit of account 
and a medium of exchange, can and should strict laissez-faire be 
the rule for banking-broadly  defined to include the issuance of 
inside money in the form of currency as well as deposits-except 
only for the general rules applied to all other economic activity? 
This is the so-called free-banking question, which bears partic- 
ularly on items [2] and [4] of Friedman’s “good reasons.” 
In terms of institutional and legal arrangements, the major sub- 
issues are: 
(1) Should financial intermediaries be prohibited from issuing 
inside money in the form of hand-to-hand currency, i.e., should 
hand-to-hand currency be a government monopoly? 
(b) Are governmental limitations on lending and investing by 
financial intermediaries necessary or desirable? 
(c) Is a government “lender of  last resort’’-a  central bank- 
necessary or desirable? 
(3) In the absence of legal obstacles, can, should, and would the unit 
of account be separated in practice from the medium of exchange 
function in the belief that financial innovation will render outside 
money unnecessary and obsolete? I.e.,  do financial innovations 
promise to make a 100 percent inside money the most efficient 
means of engaging in transactions? 
It may be worth noting explicitly that the word “can” as used in these 
questions admits of two very different interpretations. One is narrowly 
economic: is a given set of arrangements internally consistent so far 
as narrowly economic conditions are concerned; that is, would it gen- 
erate a stable equilibrium, both static and dynamic? The other is broader. 
Would the set of arrangements generate a stable political as well as 
economic equilibrium; that is, is its existence consistent with the po- 
litical constitution, or  would it generate political forces leading to major 
changes in the arrangements? 
We  believe that failure to distinguish between these interpretations 
is responsible for much of the appearance of disagreement in the dis- 
cussions of  monetary reform. 
Of  the three questions posed, we propose to discuss the first two, 
since the third is much less related to our earlier work, and besides, 
has been dealt with recently, and in our opinion correctly, by others 
[McCallum (1985) and White (1984b)l. 
The first and third questions are new in a sense in which the second 
is not. Essentially all participants in the nineteenth- and early twentieth- 
century controversies about monetary and banking matters took for 
granted a specie standard, in which government’s role was restricted 
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specie); hence they never had occasion to consider the first and third 
questions. Suspension of specie payments was regarded as, and in fact 
generally was, a temporary expedient to meet a temporary difficulty. 
Any government-issued money (whether notes or deposits) in excess 
of  specie reserves was, in modem terminology, regarded as inside money, 
not outside money, though it clearly became the latter during periods 
of  suspension of  specie payments. This common view no doubt re- 
flected widespread agreement that historical  experience showed, as 
Irving Fisher put it in 191  1, that “Irredeemable paper money has almost 
invariably  proved a curse to the country employing it”  [see Fisher 
(1929, p.  131)]. 
The disappearance of specie standards and the emergence of a world 
monetary system in which, for the first time, every country is, in Fish- 
er’s terms, on an “irredeemable paper standard”  has produced two 
very different streams of literature: one, scientific; the other, popular. 
The scientific literature is that already referred to, dealing with mon- 
etary reform  and the government’s role in providing outside money 
(section  12.2 below).  The popular  literature  is  alarmist  and  “hard 
money,”  essentially all of  it based  on the proposition that  Fisher’s 
generalization  will continue to hold and that the world is inevitably 
condemned to runaway inflation unless and until the leading nations 
adopt commodity standards. 
There has been some, but limited, intersection between these two 
streams. The scientific literature has occasionally dealt with but mostly 
ignored the question raised by the popular literature. Have the con- 
ditions that have produced the current unprecedented monetary system 
also altered the likelihood that it will go the way of earlier paper stan- 
dards? We  consider that question in a tentative way in section  12.4 
below. 
By contrast with outside money, free banking was fully and exhaus- 
tively discussed in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Recent 
literature has added much historical detail, discussed the arguments in 
terms of current monetary arrangements, and expressed old arguments 
in more formal and abstract terms. And we now have a much wider 
span of historical experience on which to base ajudgment. Nonetheless, 
Vera Smith’s 1936 Rationale of Central Banking provides, we believe, 
as accurate and complete a summary of  recent theoretical arguments 
for and against  “free  banking”  as it  does of  the earlier arguments 
(section 12.3). 
U.2  Outside Money 
Whether the government has a role in providing outside money, and 
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intervene in the provision of inside money by non-government banking 
institutions.  Existing  banking systems rest on the foundation of  an 
outside money, and so did those “free banking”  systems, such as the 
Scottish, Canadian and early US,  that have recently been subjected 
to reexamination and offered as object lessons. Historically, a single 
unit of account linked to a single dominant outside money has tended 
to emerge, initially via a market process of transactors settling on a 
particular commodity, followed almost invariably by government’s ex- 
ercising control over one or more aspects of the issuance of outside 
money-typically  with the ostensible purpose of standardizing the coin- 
age and certifying its quality (purity, fineness, etc.). Occasionally, two 
commodities, with  a flexible rate of  exchange between them, have 
simultaneously been outside moneys, one for small transactions, the 
other for large, as with silver and gold in the Middle Ages, or copper 
and silver in China. 
Insofar as governments confined themselves to producing standard- 
ized  coinage,  the  activity was  a  source of  revenue  because  of  the 
convenience to the public of using for transaction purposes coins with 
a stated face value rather than bullion. The mint could make a “seignor- 
age” charge for providing this service, and the government’s visibility 
and authority gave it an advantage over private mints even when it did 
not prohibit them. However, governments have repeatedly gone farther 
and have used (or abused) their control over outside money to raise 
revenue by introducing fiat elements. Initially, this took the form of 
the debasement of the metallic coinage issued by the sovereign-that 
is, increasing the proportion of base metal in silver and gold coins, so 
that the stated face value of the coins exceeded the market value of 
the precious metal they contained. Such debasement was a source of 
revenue because of the lag in the adjustment of nominal prices to the 
lowered precious metal content of the coins. During this period, the 
base metal served, as it were, as inside money. 
The introduction and subsequent widespread  use of  paper money 
and deposits, initially as warehouse receipts for specie, opened a broader 
range of possibilities, exploited both by private individuals or bankers 
who issued notes and deposits promising to pay specie on demand in 
excess of the amount of specie they held (private inside money, so long 
as the issuers honored the promise), and by governments that did the 
same (government inside money, subject to the same proviso). 
As banking developed, commercial banks came to regard all non- 
interest bearing government issues-in  the U.K.,  notes and deposits 
at the Bank of England; in the U.S., United States notes (greenbacks), 
national bank notes, silver certificates, Federal Reserve notes and de- 
posits-as  outside money. However, for the system as a whole, so long 
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outside money; the excess of government issues over the government’s 
specie holdings was government-created inside money. All such issues, 
however, became true outside money-pure  fiat money-when  con- 
vertibility was suspended, as it now has been throughout the world. 
We  still refer to government-issued non-interest bearing notes and 
deposits as government “liabilities”  or “obligations,”  although that is 
not what they are, as is eminently clear in other contexts. We now take 
a pure fiat standard so much for granted that we no longer find any 
need to distinguish between the concepts of outside money relevant 
for the commercial banks and for the system as a whole.  But that 
distinction remains important in judging proposals for monetary re- 
form, and in interpreting historical experience. 
That experience provides striking evidence of the value that com- 
munities attach to having a single unit of account and medium of ex- 
change. The large revenue that governments have been able to extract 
by introducing fiat elements into outside money is one measure of the 
price that economic agents are willing to pay to preserve the unit of 
account and the medium of exchange to which they have become ha- 
bituated. It takes truly major depreciation in the purchasing power of 
the dominant money before any substantial fraction of the community 
adopts alternatives, either with respect to the unit of  account or the 
medium of exchange. Yet such alternatives have generally  been available. 
For example, students of money have repeatedly recommended what 
Alfred Marshall called a tabular standard, namely, the indexation of 
long-term  contracts,  so that for such contracts the unit  of  account 
becomes, to use one currency as an example, not the nominal dollar, 
but the real dollar, although the medium of exchange may remain the 
nominal dollar.2 In most Western countries, nothing has prevented the 
private emergence of  a tabular standard. Yet, a tabular standard has 
emerged on any widespread  scale only in  countries that have been 
subject to extreme movements in the price level, like some Latin Amer- 
ican countries, Israel, etc. Indexation has been privately introduced 
on any substantial scale in the U.S. only with respect to labor contracts, 
and even there only occasionally and with respect to a minority  of 
contracts. 
Another alternative has been foreign currency, which has occasion- 
ally been resorted to  both as unit of account and medium of circulation, 
but again only under extreme provocation. 
The apparently great value to the economy of having a single unit 
of account linked with an (ultimate) medium of exchange does not mean 
that government must play  any role, or that there need be a single 
producer of the medium of exchange. And indeed, historically,  gov- 
ernments have entered the picture after the event, after the community 
had settled on a unit of account and private producers had produced 
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Two features of this history are striking. The first is that the unit of 
account has, invariably or nearly so, been linked to a commodity. We 
know of no example of an abstract unit of account-a  fiduciary or fiat 
unit such as now prevails everywhere, having emerged spontaneously 
through its acceptance in private transactions. The second is how uni- 
versally government has taken over, and how often it has established 
a monopoly in the certification or production of the outside money. In 
his explanation of this phenomenon, Friedman stressed considerations 
of economic efficiency-‘‘can”  in the narrower economic sense. But 
this is clearly inadequate. The theory of public choice requires attention 
to the political forces that have produced this result and the kind of 
monetary constitution, if  any, that can avoid it.3 It is not enough to 
document the abuses that have arisen from government control of out- 
side money, or to  demonstrate the existence of alternative arrangements 
that are economically more satisfactory. We  shall be evading our task 
of explanation unless we examine the political forces that established 
government control under a wide range of political and economic cir- 
cumstances, superseding private certification and production of outside 
money. And, so far as reform is concerned, we shall simply be spitting 
in the wind, as economists have done for 200 years with respect to 
tariffs, unless we explore how effective political support can be mo- 
bilized for one or another solution. We  hasten to add that the latter is 
not the task of this paper.4 
Item [3] of Friedman’s list of “good reasons,” the technical monopoly 
character of a pure fiduciary currency (italics added) has been ques- 
tioned, particularly by Benjamin Klein (1974). Klein’s theoretical case, 
resting on the necessity for a producer of money to  establish confidence 
in his money, and the increasing capital cost of creating such confi- 
dence, is impeccable, and has received wide acceptance. Yet it is not 
clear that his argument can be carried over to a “pure fiduciary”  cur- 
rency.’  Historically, producers of  money have established confidence 
by promising convertibility into some dominant money, generally, spe- 
cie. Many examples can be cited of fairly long-continued and successful 
producers of private moneys convertible into specie.6 We do not know, 
however, of any example of the private production of purely incon- 
vertible fiduciary moneys (except as temporary expedients, e.g., wooden 
nickels, clearing house certificates), or of the simultaneous existence 
in the same community of private producers of moneys convertible 
into different ultimate media, except for the previously mentioned case 
when two metals circulated  simultaneously at a flexible rate of ex- 
change, and the somewhat similar case of the greenback period (1862- 
1878) in the U.S. when banks had both greenback and gold deposit 
liabilities. Yet  Klein’s argument would not seem to preclude the si- 
multaneous existence in the same community of several dominant mon- 
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Hayek, in his argument for the denationalization of  money, believes 
that such an outcome is a real possibility, if the current legal obstacles 
to the production of competitive moneys were removed. In particular, 
he believes that private issuers who produced a medium of exchange 
with constant purchasing power (a “real dollar”) would become dom- 
inant. He recognizes that a single dominant money might tend to de- 
velop over large areas, but anticipates that different definitions of con- 
stant purchasing  power would be appropriate for different  areas or 
groups and hence that a “number of different competitive money pro- 
ducers would survive, with extensive overlap in border areas” [Hayek 
(1978, p.  112)]. 
Entirely  aside from the question of  the political forces that  such 
arrangements would generate, we are skeptical of his conjecture, rather 
agreeing with Benjamin Klein’s (1976, p.  514) early judgment that “I 
do not think that adoption of Hayek’s . . . policy recommendation of 
complete domestic freedom of choice in currency would significantly 
reduce the amount of monopoly power on currency issue currently 
possessed by each individual European government.”’ 
So far, neither Hayek’s belief that privately produced constant pur- 
chasing power moneys would become dominant nor Klein’s and our 
skepticism has any direct empirical basis, but derive rather from an 
interpretation of historical experience under very different monetary 
arrangements than those Hayek proposes. However, some direct evi- 
dence may emerge in the near future, because of developments within 
the present system that could facilitate the issuance of constant pur- 
chasing power money. 
In the United States, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in  1980 
authorized federal savings and loan associations to make price-level- 
adjusted-mortgage (or PLAM) loans and, in 1982, to accept price-level- 
adjusted-deposits (PLAD). There seems no reason such deposits could 
not be readily transferable by checks or their equivalent, which would 
provide a medium of exchange as well as a unit of account of constant 
purchasing power. So far, apparently, no savings and loan has taken 
advantage of this possibility. However, since 1982 disinflation has been 
the rule, and confidence in a more stable future price level has grown 
rapidly. A real test will come when and if that confidence is shattered.8 
Another U.S.  development, in the course of being realized as this is 
written, is the introduction of futures markets in price index numbers 
[Friedman (1984a)l. The Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange has received 
permission from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the fed- 
eral agency that regulates futures markets) to introduce a futures con- 
tract in the consumer price index. Trading in the contract began on 
June 21,  1985. Such futures markets would enable banks  to accept 
deposits on a price-level adjusted basis  and hedge their risk  in the 299  Has Government Any Role in Money? 
futures market rather than by matching price-level adjusted liabilities 
with price-level adjusted assets. This development  seems to us the 
most promising of the recent innovations, in terms of its potential effect 
on the operation of the monetary system. 
An earlier U.S. development was the removal in 1974 of the prohi- 
bition  against  the ownership,  purchase  and  sale of  gold by private 
persons. In principle, it has been possible since then for individuals in 
private dealings to use gold as a medium of exchange. And there have 
been some minor stirrings. The Gold Standard Corporation in Kansas 
City provides facilities for deposits denominated in gold and for the 
transfer of such deposits among persons by check. However, this is a 
warehousing operation-a  100 percent reserve bank, as  it were-rather 
than a private currency denominated in gold and issued on a fractional 
reserve basis. Unfortunately, there are currently legal obstacles to any 
developments that would enable gold to be used not only as a store of 
value or part of an asset portfolio but as a unit of account or a medium 
of circulation. Hence, the current situation provides little evidence on 
what would occur if  those obstacles were removed. 
In the U.K., the government now issues securities that link interest 
and principal to a price index number. Banks could use such securities 
as assets to match price-level adjusted deposits. 
It remains to be seen whether any of  these opportunities will be 
exploited. Our personal view is that they will be if  and only if govern- 
ment monetary policy produces wide fluctuations in inflation, fluctua- 
tions even wider than those that occurred in the U.S or the U.K.  in 
recent decades. Moreover, even if they are, we conjecture that the use 
of a constant purchasing  power of money as a unit of account and 
medium of circulation will be confined to large transactions involving 
long times delays, not to small or current transactions. 
A further qualification is that the circumstance envisaged in the pre- 
ceding paragraph-wide  fluctuations in inflation in major countries- 
is not likely to prove stable and long-lasting. It is almost certain to 
produce political pressures for major monetary reform-in  the extreme, 
after it has degenerated into hyperinflation; on a more hopeful note, 
long before. 
Until recent years, true hyperinflation has occurred only in countries 
undergoing revolution or severe civil unrest or that have been defeated 
in a major war, with the possible exception of John Law’s experiment 
of doubling the French bank-note issue in the four-year period 1716 to 
1720. However, currently, several countries seem on the verge of hy- 
perinflation under relatively peaceful circumstances-Bolivia,  Argen- 
tina and Israel, to mention only the most prominent. The misfortune 
of these countries promises to provide us with some evidence on a so 
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Another recent hybrid development of considerable interest is the 
increased use of the ECU (European Currency Unit) in private trans- 
actions. The ECU is a composite of the separate national currencies 
of those Common Market countries participating in the European Mon- 
etary System-or, as it has come to be described, a basket containing 
specified numbers of units of each of the national currencies included 
in it. Its value in terms of any single national currency, including the 
dollar or any of the currencies composing it, is thus a weighted average 
of the market values in terms of that currency of the component ECU 
currencies. Though initially created for clearing intergovernmental bal- 
ances, it has increasingly been used  as a unit of account in private 
bond issues and other transactions [see Triffin (1984, especially pp. 
150-163)],  and banks in some countries have been offering ECU de- 
nominated deposits, though in others, such as Germany, they are cur- 
rently not permitted to do so. So far, the ECU has been convertible 
into dollars and most other currencies. However, it has been in exis- 
tence only since 1979, so it is still in the early stages of development. 
What role it will play in the future is highly uncertain. 
The ECU is a governmentally created  and issued currency.  It is 
convertible only into other governmentally created and issued curren- 
cies, all of which are purely fiduciary, despite lip service still paid to 
gold by including gold, generally at an artificial price, as a “reserve 
asset” in the balance sheets of the central banks. What is unique is its 
composite character, resembling in this respect the fiduciary counter- 
part to the symmetallic proposal by Marshall and the later commodity 
reserve proposals.9 
It does offer an alternative to the separate national currencies and 
so does enhance currency competition. However, its growth and wider 
use would represent joint government action in the field of money along 
the lines of the International Monetary Fund, rather than private action. 
As with  national currencies, private  action would  take the form of 
producing inside money convertible into the ECU as an outside money. 
Items [3] and [4] of  Friedman’s list of  “good  reasons,”  technical 
monopoly and external effects, have been questioned also by Roland 
Vaubel (1984) in a thoughtful article. He concludes that neither is a 
valid justification for a government monopoly in the production of base 
money. 
With respect to natural monopoly, he concludes that “the only valid 
test of the natural monopoly argument is to abolish all barriers to entry 
and to admit free currency competition from private issuers on equal 
terms” [Vaubel(l984, p. 57)]. We agree with him entirely on this point 
while, as noted earlier, being highly skeptical that, given the starting 
point with a government currency firmly established, any private is- 
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a “pure fiduciary”  money.  As already  noted, there is no historical 
precedent. Historical experience suggests that the only plausible  al- 
ternative to a government issued fiduciary currency is a commodity 
currency, with private issuers producing inside money convertible into 
the commodity. And we believe that even that outcome is highly un- 
likely unless there is a major collapse of national currencies-something 
approximating hyperinflation on a worldwide scale. 
With respect to externalities, Vaubel’s negative conclusion is a quib- 
ble with respect to the basic issue of whether government has a key 
role to play in the monetary system. Even if there are externalities, he 
says, it “does not follow that government should produce money (let 
alone as a monopolist) rather than introduce a mandatory deposit in- 
surance scheme or act as a lender of  last resort by borrowing and 
lending private  money”  [Vaubel (1984, p.  32)].  But either of  these 
policies would be a far cry from leaving “money and banking arrange- 
ments . . . to the market.” 
To summarize our answer to the first question: there is no economic 
reason why the determination of a unit of account linked with a medium 
of  exchange and the provision of outside money cannot be left to the 
market. But history suggests both that any privately generated unit of 
account will be linked to a commodity and that government will not 
long keep aloof. Under a wide variety of economic and political cir- 
cumstances, a monetary system has emerged that rests on a unit of 
account and on outside money at least certified, and generally more 
than that, by government. Such a system will not easily be dislodged 
or replaced by a strictly private system. 
12.3  Free Banking 
A number of recent authors have argued that the historical experience 
with “free  banking”  is less unfavorable than suggested by Friedman 
and other authors. Lawrence White has reexamined the experience in 
Scotland for the period up to 1845 and concluded that it supports “the 
case for thorough deregulation”  of banking [White (1984a, p.  148)]. 
Rockoff (1975), Rolnick and Weber (1983) and King (1983) have reex- 
amined the experience in the United States prior to the Civil War and 
come to a similar conclusion, arguing that prior studies of this period 
have grossly exaggerated the quantitative importance of “wildcat bank- 
ing,’’ overissue of depreciated bank notes, and the other ills generally 
associated with banking in that era. 
The experience of Scotland, as most recently described by White, 
is surely the most favorable. For more than a century and a half Scotland 
had a system of free banking, with completely free entry and minimal 
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issue as well as of deposit. Their note issues circulated widely and 
were in practice the dominant medium of circulation. With minor ex- 
ceptions the issues of different banks-numbering  as many as 29  in 
1826 and 19 in 1845, just before the end of the era of free banking- 
circulated at par with one another, thanks to an agreement among the 
banks to accept one another’s notes [White (1984a, pp. 35, 37)]. Some 
banks did fail, but holders of their notes suffered negligible, if  any, 
losses.  And  this  system developed entirely  by  market forces, with 
government intervention consisting solely in the chartering of three of 
the banks. 
However, before accepting the relevance of this experience to our 
current situation, it is important  to note  several special features of 
Scottish experience: first,  it  dealt  only with  inside  money.  Outside 
money consisted of either gold or, during the period of suspension of 
convertibility by the Bank of England (1797-1821),  Bank of England 
notes. Second, as White stresses (1984a, p. 41), shareholders of banks 
assumed unlimited liability for the  obligations of  the banks.IO As a 
result, bank depositors and holders of bank notes were sheltered from 
the failure of banks; the whole burden fell on the stockholders. Third, 
Scotland was an old, established community, with a relatively stable 
population, so that stockholders consisted in the main of persons who 
were well known, had considerable private wealth and valued their 
own reputations for probity highly enough to honor their obligations.  II 
Fourth, while the only equivalent in Scotland itself of a central bank 
was the extent to which some of the larger banks served as bankers’ 
banks, the Scottish banks had access to the London financial market, 
which performed the equivalent of some modern central bank functions 
for Scotland [see Goodhart (1985, sect. 5, note 3)]. 
For a contrast, consider the experience of the United States from, 
say, 1791 to 1836, the period spanning the first and second Banks of 
the United States. New England perhaps came closest to matching 
Scotland in some of its characteristics, particularly in containing sub- 
stantial communities with long-settled prominent families possessing 
much wealth.  It was taken for granted that specie was the dominant 
money  and provided  the appropriate unit  of  account.  In the main, 
laissez-faire  prevailed  in  banking,  despite the  existence  of  the  two 
Federal banks, as Hammond (1957) calls them. There was nothing that 
prevented a system from developing along Scottish lines. Yet it did 
not. Numerous banks were established, which issued bank notes prom- 
ising to pay specie on demand, yet a wide range of imaginative strat- 
agems were adopted to postpone and impede redemption, and country 
bank notes circulated in Boston at varying discounts, leading Boston 
banks to adopt a succession of  measures to enforce redemption. The 
end result was the famous Suffolk Bank system, which developed grad- 303  Has Government Any Role in Money? 
ually from about 1820 on. As Hammond (1957, pp. 554, 556) remarks: 
“The Suffolk was in effect the central bank of New England. . . .  The 
operators of the Suffolk Bank showed laissez-faire at its best.”  But 
even here, laissez-faire  did not lead to unlimited liability as a rule, 
though there must have been private bankers who subjected themselves 
to unlimited liability; it did not lead to the kind of orderly, efficient, 
monetary system that developed in Scotland. 
And the experience of the rest of the country is even less favorable 
to regarding the Scottish experience as highly relevant to the circum- 
stances of  the U.S.  in  the early decades of the nineteenth century. 
Various degrees  of  laissez-faire  prevailed  in  the several  states, but 
nowhere did it lead to unlimited liability, freely interconvertible bank 
notes, security of both note holders and depositors from loss, and the 
other favorable characteristics of the Scottish banking system. 
Rockoff, Rolnick and Weber, and King may well be right that wildcat 
banking in the first half of the nineteenth century was less widespread 
and extensive than earlier writers made it out to be. They may also be 
correct that the bank failures that occurred owed far more to the legal 
conditions imposed on bank note issues-namely,  that they be “backed” 
by state or U.S. bonds-and  the subsequent depreciation in value of 
the bonds of a number of states than to irresponsible wildcat banking. 
Yet none of their evidence is directly relevant to the question of  how 
banking and currency issue would have developed in the absence of 
state legislation. 
Further, conditions have changed drastically in the past century and 
a half in ways that are particularly relevant to the question whether 
financial intermediaries should be prohibited from issuing inside money 
in the form of hand-to-hand currency [our point 2(a) in section 12.11. 
We are no longer dealing with a sparsely settled country in which travel 
is slow and communication between distant points involves long delays. 
We  now have instant communication and rapid  means of  transport. 
Book entries have replaced the physical transfer of currency or specie 
as the principal means of discharging monetary obligations. From being 
the primary medium of exchange, currency has become the counterpart 
of a minor fraction of aggregate transactions. Private institutions, both 
banks and non-banks,  issue inside money  in the form  of  traveler’s 
checks redeemable on demand in outside money. The value of such 
traveler’s checks outstanding is now included in the official estimates 
of all monetary aggregates broader than the monetary base (equal to 
outside money).  The possibility-and  reality-of fraud by financial 
institutions remains, but under current conditions it seems unlikely to 
be more serious for hand-to-hand currency than for deposits. 
What was a burning issue a century or  two ago has therefore become 
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Hayek discussed in the preceding section are far more persuasive with 
respect to permitting the issuance of hand-to-hand inside money than 
with respect to the possibility that the private market might produce 
fiduciary outside money, i.e., a non-commodity outside money. While 
we therefore see no reason currently to prohibit banks from issuing 
hand-to-hand currency, there is no pressure by banks or other groups 
to gain that privilege. The question of government monopoly of hand- 
to-hand currency is likely to remain a largely dead issue. 
The more important questions currently are the other two under this 
heading: namely, the restrictions, if  any, that government should im- 
pose on financial intermediaries and the necessity or desirability of  a 
“lender  of last resort.”  Whatever conclusions one may reach about 
these issues, it seems to us, would currently be valid regardless of the 
form of the liabilities issued by the financial intermediaries. 
In respect of these questions, conditions have changed much less 
drastically-as  the recent liquidity crises arising out of the problems 
of Continental Illinois Bank and the failure of Home State Savings in 
Ohio vividly illustrate. These liquidity crises are of the same genus as 
those that occurred  repeatedly  during the nineteenth  century. Their 
very different outcomes-no  significant spread to other institutions in 
the Continental Illinois episode; the permanent closing of many Ohio 
savings and loans and temporary closing of all of them in the quanti- 
tatively far smaller Ohio episode-reflect  the different way they were 
handled-and  that too evokes historical echoes. 
Governor Celeste of Ohio would have benefited greatly from reading 
and following Walter Bagehot’s (1873) famous advice on how to handle 
an “internal drain”:  “A  panic,”  he wrote, “in a word, is a species of 
neuralgia, and according to the rules of science you must not starve 
it. The holders of  the cash reserve must be ready not only to keep it 
for their own liabilities, but to advance it most freely for the liabilities 
of others” [Bagehot (1873, p. 51)l. 
The run on the Ohio savings and loan associations precipitated by 
the failure of Home State Savings could have been promptly stemmed 
if Bagehot’s advice had been followed. It was only necessary for Gov- 
ernor Celeste to arrange with the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
and the commercial banks of Ohio-who  were apparently more than 
willing-to  lend currency and its equivalent to the savings and loans 
on the collateral of their temporarily illiquid but sound assets. Once 
the savings and loans demonstrated their ability to meet all demands 
of depositors for cash, the unusual demand would have evaporated- 
as many historical examples demonstrate, including, most recently, the 
stemming of the liquidity crisis following  the Continental Illinois episode. 
Instead, Governor Celeste blundered by declaring a savings and loan 
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1933, ending in the 1933 bank holiday. As in that case, the final result 
of  not recognizing the differences between a liquidity and a solvency 
crisis will doubtless be the failure or liquidation of many savings and 
loans that would have been sound and solvent in the absence of  the 
savings and loan holiday. 
These episodes show that what used to be called “the inherent insta- 
bility”  of  a fractional reserve banking system is, unfortunately, still 
alive and well.  What  they  do not  show, and what is  still an open 
question, is whether a government “lender of  last resort”-a  central 
bank-is  necessary and desirable as a cure. It did not prove to be a 
cure in the U.S. in the 1930s; it did in the Continental Illinois case, as 
well as in some earlier episodes. And, whether a satisfactory cure or 
not, is the emergence of a “lender of last resort” a likely or unavoidable 
consequence of  financial development? 
In a recent paper, Charles Goodhart, after surveying a wide range 
of historical evidence, including the studies we have referred to earlier, 
concludes that the emergence of  “lenders of  last resort” in the form 
of central banks was a natural and desirable development arising from 
the very characteristics of  a fractional reserve banking system. The 
theoretical argument is straightforward and well-known. It rests on the 
distinction, already referred to, between a liquidity and solvency crisis. 
A bank or any other institution faces a problem of solvency if  its lia- 
bilities exceed the value of its assets. The magnitude of  the problem 
is measured by the difference between the two. That difference may 
be a small fraction of total liabilities, perhaps even less than the equity 
of the shareholders, so that if the assets could be liquidated in an orderly 
fashion the institution could pay off all other liabilities in full or for 
that matter continue as a going institution. The special feature of  a 
fractional-reserve bank is that the bulk of  its liabilities are payable on 
demand-ither  by contract or usage. Hence, even in the special case 
assumed, it will face a liquidity problem if  its depositors demand pay- 
ment. Moreover, the bank’s liquidity problem will be far larger in mag- 
nitude than  its solvency pr0b1em.l~  It  cannot satisfy its depositors 
unless it can in  some way convert its temporarily illiquid assets into 
cash. 
A liquidity problem is not likely to remain confined to a single bank. 
The difficulty of  one bank  gives rise to fears about others, whose 
depositors, not well-informed about the banks’ condition, seek to con- 
vert their deposits into cash. A full-blown liquidity crisis of  major 
dimensions can be prevented only if depositors can somehow be re- 
assured. An individual bank may be able to reassure its depositors by 
borrowing cash on the collateral of its sound assets from other banks 
and meeting all demands on it. But  if  the crisis is widespread, that 
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central bank with the power to create outside money is potentially such 
a source. 
After the Federal Reserve in the early 1930s failed to perform the 
function for which it had been established, the U.S. enacted Federal 
Deposit Insurance as an alternative way  to reassure depositors and 
thereby prevent a widespread liquidity crisis. That device worked ef- 
fectively for decades, so long as banks were closely regulated-and 
incidentally sheltered from competition-and  so long as inflation re- 
mained moderate and relatively stable. It has become less and less 
effective as deregulation proceeded in  an environment of  high  and 
variable inflation. In the Continental Illinois case, it had to be supple- 
mented by the Federal Reserve as “lender of  last resort.” 
Insurance of  depositors against bank insolvency is of  a magnitude 
that is well within the capacity of  private casualty insurance. It could 
allow for differences among banks in the riskiness of their assets much 
more effectively than government insurance [see Ely (1985a, b)]. 
A liquidity crisis, whether or not its arises out of an insolvency crisis, 
as it did with Continental Illinois and Home State Savings of Ohio, and 
whether or not it spreads to solvent banks, is a different matter. In the 
U.S.,  prior to the Federal Reserve, it was dealt with by a concerted 
agreement among banks to suspend convertibility of deposits into cash- 
to pay deposits only  “through the clearing house.”  In some other 
countries, such as Canada, nationwide branch banks (subject to ex- 
tensive government regulation) have preserved confidence sufficiently 
to avoid liquidity crises. 
The U.S. has been almost unique in preserving a unit banking system 
with numekous independent banks. The current pressures for deregu- 
lation and the widening competition in financial intermediation is chang- 
ing that situation. The barriers against interstate banking are weakening 
and very likely will ultimately fall completely. Such “non-banks”  as 
Sears Roebuck, Menill-Lynch, and so on, in  most respects are the 
equivalent of  nationwide branch banks. These developments, as they 
mature, will  simultaneously lessen the probability of  liquidity crises 
and increase the magnitude and severity of those that occur. It is there- 
fore far from clear what implications they have for the “lender of  last 
resort” function. 
Vera Smith (1936, p.  148) rightly concluded: “A  central bank is not 
a natural product of banking development. It is imposed from outside 
or comes into being as a result of Government favours.” However, as 
Goodhart’s (1985) exhaustive survey of  the historical experience in- 
dicates, a central bank or its equivalent, once established, reluctantly 
assumed the responsibility of serving as a lender of last resort because 
of  the reality or possibility of  a liquidity crisis. What  is impressive 
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political and economic arrangements-and  the long span of time for 
which that has proved the outcome. 
In practice, the lender of last resort function has been combined with 
control over government outside money. Such a combination has ob- 
vious advantages. However, in  principle the two functions could be 
separated, and some proposals for monetary reform would require such 
separation, if the government were to continue to serve as a lender of 
last resort.14 
The existence of  a lender of  last resort has clearly enabled banks 
having access to the lender to operate on thinner margins of capital 
and cash reserves than they would otherwise have deemed prudent. 
This fact has been used as an argument both for and against the gov- 
ernment assuming lender of  last resort functions-for,  as a way  of 
lowering the cost of  financial intermediation; against, as providing an 
implicit subsidy to financial intermediation. It has also led to the im- 
position of required reserve ratios, which has turned a subsidy into a 
tax by increasing the demand for non-interest bearing outside money. 
Deregulation of financial intermediaries so that they are free to pay 
whatever interest is required to obtain funds and to offer a variety of 
services over broad  geographical areas  seems clearly  desirable on 
grounds of  market efficiency. The open question is whether that is 
feasible or desirable without a continued role for government in such 
matters as requiring registration, provision of  information, and the 
imposition of capital or reserve requirements. Moreover, certainly dur- 
ing a transition period, deregulation increases the danger of liquidity 
crises and so may strengthen the case for a governmental “lender of 
last resort.”l5 That role could perhaps be phased out if  market devel- 
opments provided protection through insurance or otherwise against 
the new risks that might arise in a deregulated financial system. 
Goodhart’s argument (1985) that such an outcome, whether desirable 
or not,  is not  achievable, can be  put  to the test,  by enlarging the 
opportunities for private insurance of  deposit liabilities. If  such insur- 
ance became widespread, risk-adjusted premiums could render regu- 
latory restrictions unnecessary. It is more difficult to envision the mar- 
ket arrangements that would eliminate the pressure for a government 
“lender of  last resort.” 
12.4  The Future of Fiat Money 
As noted earlier, the nations of  the world are for the first time in 
history essentially unanimously committed to a purely fiat monetary 
standard. Will Fisher’s (1911b) generalization that “irredeemable paper 
money has almost invariably proved a curse to the country employing 
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the most interesting and important current scientific question in the 
monetary area. How it is answered will largely determine the relevance 
of the issues discussed in the preceding two sections. 
We do not believe it is possible to give a confident and unambiguous 
answer. The experience of such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico and Israel are contemporary examples of Fisher’s generaliza- 
tion, but they are all lesser developed countries that except for chro- 
nology may have more in common with the countries Fisher had in 
mind than with the more advanced Western countries. The experience 
of those more advanced countries-Japan,  the United States and the 
members of the Common Market-gives  grounds for greater optimism. 
The pressures on government that led to the destruction  of  earlier 
irredeemable paper moneys are every bit as strong today in these coun- 
tries than earlier-most  clearly, the pressure to obtain resources for 
government use without levying explicit taxes. However, developments 
in the economy, and in financial markets in particular, have produced 
counter-pressures that reduce the political attractiveness of paper money 
inflation. 
The most important such developments, we believe, are the greater 
sensitivity and  sophistication of both the financial markets and the 
public at large. There has indeed been an information revolution, which 
has greatly reduced the cost of acquiring information and has enabled 
expectations to respond more rapidly and accurately to developments. 
Historically,  inflation has added to government resources in three 
ways: first, through the paper money issues themselves (i.e., the im- 
plicit inflation tax on outside money  holdings); second, through the 
unvoted increase in explicit taxes as a result of bracket creep; third, 
by the reduction in the real value of outstanding debt issued at interest 
rates that did not include sufficient allowance for future inflation. The 
economic, political and financial developments of recent decades have 
eroded the potency of  all three sources of  revenue. 
Though outside money remained remarkably constant at about  10 
percent of national income from the middle of the past century to the 
Great Depression, and then rose sharply to a peak of about 25 percent 
in  1946, it has been on a declining trend since the end of World War 
11, and is currently about 7 percent of national income. However, for 
a modem society, with the current level of government taxes and spend- 
ing, this component is perhaps the least important of the three. Even 
if  outside money as a fraction of income did not decline as a result of 
inflation which it unquestionably would, a 10 percent per year increase 
in outside money would yield as revenue to the government only about 
seven-tenths of  1 percent of national income. 
The second component of revenue has very likely been more im- 
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persons to levels of personal income tax that could never have been 
voted explicitly. However, the result has been political pressure that 
has led to the indexation of the personal income tax schedule for in- 
flation, which largely eliminates this source of revenue. 
The third component has also been extremely important. At the end 
of World War 11, the funded federal debt amounted to 6 percent more 
than a year’s national income. By 1967 it was down to about 32 percent 
of national income despite repeated “deficits”  in the official federal 
budget. Since then it has risen as deficits have continued and increased, 
but even so only to about 36  percent  currently. The reason for the 
decline in the deficit ratio was partly real growth but mostly the re- 
duction through inflation in the real value of debt that has been issued 
at interest rates that ex posr proved negative in real terms. 
The potency of this source of revenue has been sharply eroded by 
the developments in the financial markets referred to earlier. Market 
pressures have made it difficult for the government to issue long-term 
debt at low nominal rates. One result is that the average term to maturity 
of the federal debt has tended to decline. Except under wartime con- 
ditions, it is far more difficult to convert interest rates on short-term 
debt into ex posr negative real rates by unanticipated inflation than to 
do so for long-term  debt. And  for both  short- and long-term  debt, 
producing unanticipated inflation of any magnitude for any substantial 
period has become far more difficult after several decades of historically 
high and variable inflation than it was even a decade or so ago, when 
the public’s perceptions still reflected the effect of a relatively stable 
price level over long periods. 
In the U.K.,  the resort to government bonds adjusted for inflation 
eliminates more directly the possibility that government can benefit 
from ex posr negative real interest rates. There have been pressures 
on the U.S. Treasury to issue similar securities. Those pressures would 
undoubtedly intensify if the U.S.  were again to experience high and 
variable inflation. 
Perhaps if, instead, we experienced several decades of a relatively 
stable long-run price level, asset holders would again be lulled into 
regarding nominal interest rates as equivalent to real interest rates. But 
that is certainly not the case today. 
To summarize, inflation has become far less attractive as a political 
option. Given a voting public very sensitive to inflation, it may currently 
be politically profitable to establish monetary arrangements that will 
make the present inconvertible paper standard an exception to Fisher’s 
generalization. 
That is a source of promise; it is far from a guarantee that Fisher’s 
generalization is obsolete. Governments have often acted under short- 
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sequences. Israel today offers a conspicuous example. It continues to 
resort to inflation under conditions that make inflation a poor source 
of revenue, if, indeed, not itself a drain. 
12.5  Conclusion 
To return to where we started, Friedman’s list of the “good reasons” 
why “monetary arrangements have seldom been left to the market,” 
what alterations are indicated by the experience and writings of the 
past quarter century? 
Point [  11, “the resource cost of a pure commodity currency and hence 
its tendency to become purely fiduciary,” has in one sense fully worked 
itself out. All money is now fiduciary. Yet the resource cost has not 
been eliminated; it remains present because private individuals hoard 
precious metals and gold and silver coins as a hedge against the inflation 
that they fear may result from a wholly fiduciary money. To go farther 
afield, a new resource cost has been added because a purely fiduciary 
currency reduces the long-run predictability  of the price level. That 
cost takes the form of resources employed in futures and other financial 
markets to provide the additional hedging facilities demanded by in- 
dividuals, business enterprises and governmental bodies. It would be 
a paradoxical reversal if  these new forms of resource costs produced 
pressure for the reintroduction of commodity elements into money as 
a way to reduce the resource costs of the monetary system. We do not 
know of any study that has tried to compare the resource costs of the 
pre-World  War I monetary system and the post-1971 monetary system. 
That is a challenging task for research [Friedman (1986)l. 
Point  [2],  “the peculiar difficulty of enforcing contracts involving 
promises to pay that serve as a medium of exchange and of preventing 
fraud in respect of them,” remains alive and well, as the recent Con- 
tinental Illinois and Ohio Savings and Loan episodes demonstrate, and, 
more indirectly, the much publicized failures in the government bond 
market.  However, the character of  the difficulty has changed. It no 
longer  seems any more  serious for hand-to-hand currency than for 
deposits or other monetary or quasi-monetary promises to pay. More- 
over, it is now taken for granted that governments (i.e., taxpayers) will 
completely shield holders of deposit liabilities from loss, whether due 
to fraud or other causes. The improvements in communication and in 
the extent and sophistication of financial markets have in some respects 
increased, in others decreased, the difficulty of enforcing contracts and 
preventing fraud. They have certainly made it more difficult politically 
for governments to remain uninvolved. 
Point  [3],  “the  technical monopoly  character of  a pure fiduciary 
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its amount,”  has been questioned, far more persuasively, we believe, 
for currencies convertible into a commodity, than for a pure fiduciary 
currency. We continue to believe that the possibility that private issuers 
can (in either sense of that term) provide competing, efficient and safe 
fiduciary currencies with no role for governmental monetary authorities 
remains to be demonstrated. As a result we believe that this is the most 
important challenge posed by the elimination of a commodity-based 
outside money. 
Point [4],  “the pervasive character of money” and the “important 
effects on parties other than those directly involved” in the issuance 
of money, has not been questioned. What has been questioned, and 
remains very much an open question, is what institutional arrangements 
would minimize those third party effects. A strong case can be made 
that government involvement has made matters worse rather than bet- 
ter both directly  and indirectly because the failure of monetary au- 
thorities to pursue a stable non-inflationary policy renders performance 
by private intermediaries equally unstable. As yet, there has developed 
no consensus on desirable alternative arrangements, let alone any ef- 
fective political movement to adopt alternative arrangements. 
Our own conclusion-like  that of Walter Bagehot and Vera Smith- 
is that leaving monetary and banking arrangements to the market would 
have produced a more satisfactory outcome than was actually achieved 
through governmental involvement. Nevertheless, we also believe that 
the same forces that prevented that outcome in the past will continue 
to prevent it in the future. Whether those forces produce or prevent 
major changes in monetary institutions will depend on developments 
in the monetary area in the next several decades-and that crystal ball 
is rendered even more murky than usual by our venture into largely 
unexplored monetary terrain. 
The failure to recognize that we are in unexplored terrain gives an 
air of  unreality and paradox to the whole discussion of private money 
and free banking. Its basis was well expressed by Walter Bagehot over 
a century ago, in the context of the free banking issue. Said Bagehot 
We  are so accustomed to a system of  banking, dependent for its 
cardinal function on a single bank, that we can hardly conceive of 
any other. But the natural system-that  which would have sprung 
up if  Government had let banking alone-is  that of many banks of 
equal or not altogether unequal size. . . . 
I shall be at once asked-Do  you propose a revolution? Do you 
propose to abandon the one-reserve system, and create anew a many- 
reserve system? My plain answer is, that I do not propose it: I know 
it would be childish . . .  [A]n immense system of credit, founded on 
the Bank of England as its pivot and its basis, now exists. The  English 
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people and foreigners too, trust it implicitly . . .  The whole rests on 
an instinctive confidence generated by use and years. . . . [I]f some 
calamity swept it away, generations must  elapse before at all the 
same trust would be placed in any other equivalent. A many-reserve 
system, if some miracle should put it down in Lombard Street, would 
seem monstrous there. Nobody would understand it, or confide in 
it.  Credit is a power which may grow, but cannot  be constructed 
(italics added). 
Substitute “unit of  account”  or “outside money”  for “credit”  in 
the italicized sentence and it is directly relevant to the outside money 
issue. What has happened to the role of gold since Bagehot wrote, the 
way in which it has been replaced by a purely fiat money, is a striking 
application of  Bagehot’s proposition. It took “generations” for con- 
fidence in gold “generated by use and years” to erode and for confi- 
dence to develop in the pieces of  paper which for many years after it 
was meaningless continued to contain the promise that “The United 
States of  America will pay to the bearer on demand -  dollars,” or 
words to that effect. Now they simply state “Federal Reserve Note,” 
“One Dollar” or “-  Dollars” plus the statement “This note is legal 
tender for all debts, public and private.” And even now, a half-century 
after the effective end of the domestic convertibility of government 
issued money into gold, the Federal Reserve still lists the “Gold Stock,” 
valued at an artificial “legal”  price among the  “Factors  Supplying 
Reserve Funds.”  Like old  soldiers, gold  does not die; it just fades 
away. 
Similarly, as already noted, there are no effective legal obstacles 
currently in  the U.S.  to the development of  a private “real”  (i.e., 
inflation adjusted) standard as an alternative to the paper dollar, yet, 
absent a major monetary catastrophe, it will take decades for such an 
alternative to become a serious competitor to the paper dollar, if it ever 
does. 
The element of paradox arises particularly with respect to the views 
of Hayek [see especially Hayek (1979, vol. 3)].  His latest works have 
been devoted to explaining how gradual cultural evolution-a  wide- 
spread invisible hand  process-produces  institutions and social ar- 
rangements that are far superior to those that are deliberately con- 
structed by  explicit human design. Yet  he recommends in his recent 
publications on competitive currencies replacing the results of such an 
invisible hand process by a deliberate construct-the  introduction of 
currency competition. This paradox affects us all. On the one hand, 
we are observers of the forces shaping society; on the other, we are 
participants and want ourselves to shape society. 
If  there is a resolution to this paradox, it occurs at times of crisis. 
Then and only then are major changes in monetary and other institu- 313  Has Government Any Role in Money? 
tions likely or even possible. What changes then occur depend on the 
alternatives that are recognized as available. Decades of  academic ar- 
gument in favor of eliminating Regulation Q and, in a very different 
area, adopting flexible exchange rates had little or no impact on insti- 
tutional arrangements until crises made major changes inevitable. The 
existence of well articulated cases for these changes made them realistic 
options. 
Similarly, the wide-ranging discussion  of possible major monetary 
reforms will have little effect on the course of events if the present fiat 
system into which the world has drifted operates in a reasonably sat- 
isfactory manner-producing  neither major inflations nor major depres- 
sions. However, the possibility that it will not do so is very real- 
particularly that it will fall victim to Fisher’s generalization and lead 
to major inflation. When  and if  it does, what  happens will  depend 
critically on the options that have been explored by the intellectual 
community and have become intellectually respectable. That-the  wid- 
ening of the range of options and keeping them available-is,  we be- 
lieve, the major contribution of the burst of  scholarly interest in mon- 
etary reform. 
Notes 
1. See Acheson and Chant (1973), Brunner (1976), Buchanan (1984), Hetzel 
(  1984) and Kane (1  980). 
2. In his rediscovery and advocacy of a tabular standard, R. W.  R.  White 
(1979), former governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, proposed terming 
the corresponding unit of account, the “Real.” 
W.  Stanley Jevons (1890, pp. 328, 331), in recommending a tabular standard 
of which he says “the difficulties in the way of such a scheme are not consid- 
erable,”  refers to a  book  by Joseph Lowe (The Present State of England) 
published in 1822 which contains a similar proposal. 
3.  See, for example, Brennan and Buchanan (1981). 
4.  One of  us  has discussed elsewhere some of  the issues involved, and 
possible reforms for the U.S.  See Friedman (1984b). 
5.  McCallum (1985, p. 25) also makes this point. 
6. E.g.,  George Smith money was a widely used medium of exchange in the 
Middle West of the U.S. in the 1840s and 1850s. However, when George Smith 
retired  from control of the Wisconsin Marine and Fire Insurance Company, 
which he created to evade the state of Wisconsin’s prohibition  of banks of 
issue, George Smith money went the way of all money. His successors could 
not resist the temptation of dissipating for short-term gain the “brand name 
capital” George Smith had built up. See Hammond (1957, p. 613). The Scottish 
banks discussed by  White are another even more impressive  example of a 
competitive issue of convertible money. 
7. See also Martino (1984, especially p. 15). 314  Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz 
8. See McCulloch (1980). 
9.  See Friedman  (1951b).  Interestingly, F.  A.  Hayek (1943)  was an early 
supporter of such a proposal. 
10. Except for the three chartered banks. 
11. The extreme example was Adam Smith’s patron, the Duke of Buccleigh, 
who was a stockholder in the ill-fated Ayr bank and suffered a major loss when 
it failed in 1772. 
12. For banks, the Federal Reserve statistics include traveler’s checks with 
demand deposits, so no separate estimate of  their amount is available.  Trav- 
eler’s checks of  non-bank issuers total about 3 percent of total currency, less 
than  1 percent of total M1. 
13. For example, Continental Illinois had total deposit liabilities of close to 
$30 billion as of December 31, 1983, and non-performing loans of less than $2 
billion. Its solvency problem was still smaller, given the presence of an equity 
cushion. 
14. For example, the proposal to freeze the amount of high-powered money. 
See Friedman (1984b, pp. 48-52). 
15. This point is stressed by Summers in his comment on King (1983). He 
contrasts the possible gain in micro-efficiency of private money with what he 
regards as the likely loss in macro-efficiency through increased economic insta- 
bility.  However,  he  simply  takes it for granted  that government  control of 
money reduces rather than increases economic instability. That is, to put it 
mildly, far from clear on the basis of historical experience. 